This paper investigates how executive compensation affects the reliability of the information disclosed to investors. When incentive contracts are based on reported profits, a manager may respond to an increase in incentive compensation by decreasing effort. To both motivate the manager and maintain the quality of disclosure, it is necessary to introduce third-party verification of profits. I analyze an auditor's information acquisition and reporting decisions in two distinct cases: one in which the auditor is independent from the manager and another in which the manager and the auditor form ties through side agreements. When the manager and auditor side contract, the auditor is more likely to knowingly misreport profits, but gains better access to the manager's private information about profits; the net impact on the quality of the auditor's reporting is therefore ambiguous. However, as the manager's incentive compensation increases, collusion between the auditor and manager results in increasingly optimistic profit reports. A policy that raises the penalty imposed on the manager for misreporting profits improves the manager's incentives, but may worsen the auditor's incentives. If the auditor's oversight becomes sufficiently lax, such a policy may actually decrease investor welfare. The model predicts that raising the liability of auditors is more certain to increase the quality of the information disclosed to investors.
Introduction
A recent string of corporate scandals has focused attention on the potentially perverse effects of incentive compensation and on the degree to which conflicts of interest have impaired the ability of auditors, boards of directors, and analysts to serve in their roles as monitors. Policymakers have responded to concerns about corporate malfeasance by passing the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, which includes provisions that increase the penalties for securities fraud, increase the oversight of auditors, and ban auditors from offering certain types of non-audit services. To assess the impact of such policies and determine whether some of these policies are more likely to be effective than others, it is necessary to jointly consider the incentives of managers and auditors. In this paper, I model the interaction between the level of a manager's incentive compensation and the reporting decisions of both the manager and an auditor. I use the model to address such questions as: How does the quality of auditor oversight change with an increase in the use of incentive compensation or in the penalties managers potentially face? Do ties between a manager and an auditor necessarily reduce the reliability of the information disclosed to investors?
While investors require information on a firm's financial performance for an array of reasons, I focus on the use of such information to measure and reward performance. 1 In particular, I consider a managerial agency problem in which there are essentially two dimensions of moral hazard. The first is standard: the manager runs the firm on behalf of investors and may pursue private benefits at their expense. The second dimension of moral hazard arises from the fact that the manager privately observes profits, and thus may choose to mislead investors, though not with complete impunity-with some probability investors subsequently learn that the manager misled them, and the manager is penalized. Incentive compensation motivates the manager only to the extent that the metric (reported profits) on which the manager's compensation is based actually reflects his effort. Holding the quality of the performance measure fixed, an increase in incentive pay has the desired effect of increasing effort. However, an increase in such pay raises the manager's incentive to misreport profits, degrading the quality of the performance measure. An implication is that increasing incentives may decrease the manager's effort.
One way to relax the tension between providing the manager with incentives to maximize profits and maintaining the quality of disclosure is to introduce third-party verification of profits (though even with third-party verification the perverse interaction between incentives and effort may still remain). Much of the emphasis of my analysis is on the information acquisition and reporting decisions of an auditor. I consider two cases: one in which the auditor is independent from the manager, though still subject to moral hazard, and another in which the manager and the auditor form ties through side agreements. In the first case, the auditor's behavior is determined by her potential liability for errors, the cost of acquiring information, and her subjective degree of uncertainty as to the true realization of profits. In particular, in my model the auditor conducts an investigation, if at all, only after receiving a report from the manager. Thus the auditor has an incentive to investigate only to the extent that the manager's report is unreliable. This simple logic implies that as the penalties for fraudulent behavior on the part of the manager increase, the auditor's incentive to question an optimistic assessment of profits decreases. The decline in auditor oversight, in turn, has a feedback effect on the behavior of the manager who has an incentive to exploit the reduction in oversight. The surprising consequence is that increasing the penalties for executive misconduct may actually decrease investor welfare, or at least generate smaller benefits than might otherwise be expected.
By a similar intuition, as the manager's incentive compensation rises, the auditor takes a more skeptical stance towards the manager's assessment of profits. Thus an independent auditor to some degree counterbalances the manager's increasing temptation to misreport profits. This result is reversed when the manager and auditor can collude (or what in some circumstances might more aptly be described as cooperation). I take the approach of modeling collusion as the ability of the parties to side contract. A consequence of side contracting is that the auditor effectively internalizes the benefit to the manager of receiving the incentive compensation and is accordingly more likely to overestimate profits as the manager's incentive compensation increases. This is the obvious cost of collusion. However, side contracting also facilitates greater information-sharing between the parties. The auditor is essentially able to acquire information at a lower cost with the manager's cooperation. Interestingly, to obtain information from the manager the auditor must commit not to always report a negative revelation. One implication is that even if the auditor is operating largely in the interests of investors, she will on occasion knowingly distort her report.
The net impact of side contracting on investor welfare is generally ambiguous, though as suggested above, is more likely to be negative when the manager receives generous incentive compensation. Policies limiting the relationship between auditors and managers, such as requiring firms to rotate auditors periodically, may therefore be beneficial if the manager has high-powered incentives; in other circumstances, such policies may simply inhibit communication between the parties and lower the quality of disclosure. The policy that is most robust-in the sense that it is likely to result in more reliable disclosure, regardless of the nature of the interaction between the auditor and manager-is an increase in the auditor's liability for approving an inflated earnings report.
The following section provides an overview of the related literature. Sections 3-5 introduce and analyze the baseline model. Section 6 allows for side contracting between the auditor and the manager. Finally, Section 7 concludes.
Related Literature
In the standard model of moral hazard, there is an exogenous signal or measure that a principal uses to assess and reward an agent's performance. A well known result is that the cost of providing incentives increases as measures of the agent's performance become less informative (Gjesdal, 1982 and Grossman and Hart, 1983 ). In my model, the informativeness of the signal is endogenous and depends on the reporting of the agent and a monitor. The quality of reporting, in turn, depends on the compensation contract of the agent, creating an interaction between the agent's compensation and the quality of the performance measure.
The emphasis on the link between incentive contracts and reporting relates this paper to the literature on the perverse effects of incentive compensation. Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991) show that incentive contracts may have undesirable consequences if an agent has multidimensional tasks. If, for example, certain dimensions of performance are difficult to measure, it may be optimal for the principal to use a low-powered incentive contract so that the agent does not pursue certain tasks at the expense of others. 2 A particularly severe multi-tasking problem arises when a manager both makes decisions that impact a firm's financial performance and serves as a key source of information for investors. Compensation schemes designed to reward performance may cause the manager to report less truthfully on the firm's financial condition. 3 A large empirical literature has investigated the extent to which managers manipulate earnings reports to maximize their compensation. For example, Healy (1985) finds evidence that managers use their discretion over accounting decisions to transfer earnings between periods and exploit nonlinearities in their bonus contracts. 4 An obvious way to limit the manager's opportunistic behavior is to introduce a monitor, such as an auditor. Several papers have considered moral hazard on the part of the auditor (see, for example, Antle, 1982 and Baiman, 1987) . One of the distinguishing features of my model is that, like the manager, the auditor has a multi-tasking problem. Models of auditing typically assume that the auditor makes a one dimensional effort decision: the higher the effort, the more accurate the signal. I assume that the auditor is concerned both about overestimating and underestimating profits, and to some degree can control the likelihood of each type of error. There is a natural tradeoff between the two types of errors, and the auditor may focus her effort on reducing one type of error at the expense of the other. For example, after reviewing a firm's financial data, the auditor may choose to use a conservative standard, so that she is unlikely to overestimate earnings, or a relatively aggressive standard, so that she is unlikely to underestimate earnings. The auditor's decision depends, among other factors, on the quality of the manager's report. If the manager's reporting becomes less reliable, due to say an increase in his incentives, the auditor responds by providing investors with a more conservative assessment of earnings. While constraining the excesses of the manager, this response is not without its costs: the auditor's report becomes noisier along certain dimensions, raising the cost of motivating the manager.
The auditor's monitoring decisions also depend on the auditor's relationship with the manager. There is a substantial literature on multi-tier agency problems and collusion pioneered by Tirole (1986) . 5 A typical model consists of a principal who is uninformed about an agent's true productivity. To implement the first-best level of effort the principal must give more productive agents a substantial information rent. There is thus a tradeoff between incentives and rent extraction. A supervisor or auditor can partially resolve this tension by providing information about the agent's productivity; however, the supervisor can collude with the agent and must be given incentives to report her information truthfully. The possibility of collusion effectively introduces an additional constraint into the principal's contract design problem, and always makes the principal worse off.
However, as is emphasized in Tirole (1992) , this result rests on the assumption that the contract designed by the principal is based on the same information as any potential side contract between the agent and auditor. In my model, the principal (the investor) has a limited ability to commit and is relatively uninformed, and therefore cannot contract on as rich a set of variables as the manager and auditor. Side contracting results in greater communication between the manager and auditor, and can increase the overall quality of the audit. However, there still remains the collusive dimension of side contracting, in which the auditor takes a less conservative stance than otherwise in exchange for a side payment.
The Model

The Basic Agency Problem
The model consists of three risk-neutral parties: a manager, an investor, and an auditor. The manager undertakes a project on behalf of the investor that generates a profit, π, which is either high (π h ) or low (π l ), where ∆π = π h − π l > 0. The probability that profits are high depends on whether the manager pursues private benefits at the expense of the project. If the manager chooses to behave opportunistically, he obtains a rent b > 0, and the probability that profits are high decreases fromē to e; equivalently, the manager 5 See also Tirole and Laffont (1991) and Kofman and Lawarrée (1993) .
chooses a level of effort, e ∈ {e,ē}, where the opportunity cost of choosing a high level of effort is b. Let ∆e =ē − e. I assume that the manager's action is unobservable, and that b < ∆e∆π, implying that it is efficient for the manager to maximize expected profits. In addition, I assume that the manager is protected by limited liability (i.e., the investor cannot directly impose penalties).
When profits are observable and verifiable, the investor can resolve the moral hazard problem by offering the manager a bonus, R ≥ b/∆e, whenever profits are high. However, a key assumption of the model is that the investor cannot directly observe profits. After making his effort choice, the manager privately observes the realization of π, and makes a profit report, r ∈ {π l , π h }. If there is no auditor present, the investor must rely solely on this report to assess the manager's performance.
While the investor cannot observe the firm's current level of profits, I assume that with some probability the market learns in the future whether profits have been misreported. Let T > 0 be the exogenous expected penalty the manager incurs when he misreports profits, which includes fines, non-pecuniary punishments, loss of reputation, and any other explicit or implicit costs. An immediate implication is that if the expected penalty exceeds the bonus, R, the manager finds it optimal to report profits truthfully, and the unobservability of profits has no impact on either party. However, if R exceeds T , the bonus creates an incentive for the manager to misreport profits; moreover, since the manager's report is completely uninformative, a compensation contract based on the report does not induce any effort. Stated somewhat differently, increasing the bonus from a value below T to a value above T may actually decrease the manager's level of effort.
Assumption 1 b/∆e > T.
Assumption 1 implies that any bonus sufficiently large to cover the opportunity cost of forgoing private benefits induces misreporting. Without third-party verification of profits, the manager shirks, regardless of the bonus, and it is optimal for the investor to offer the manager a fixed wage.
This simple observation highlights the possibility that compensation packages designed to motivate managers may instead weaken their incentives to disclose information truthfully.
The Auditor
The investor can address the frictions created by the unobservability of profits by hiring an auditor to monitor the financial performance of the project. The auditor has access to an information acquisition technology and can assess the firm's performance for a fee, F . The fee, which for simplicity I take to be exogenous, is assumed to be sufficient to compensate the auditor for the cost of the audit and the opportunity cost of her labor.
The specification of the information acquisition technology captures the idea that the auditor does not simply have a one dimensional problem of choosing whether to provide the investor a more versus less precise estimate of profits, but can provide an estimate that is conservative (unlikely to overestimate profits) or relatively aggressive (unlikely to underestimate profits). In particular, the auditor chooses effort levels α and β, with α, β ∈ [1/2, 1], and obtains a signal, s. The signal equals either π h or π l , where
Given the realization of profits, the probability that the auditor's signal overestimates profits is 1 − β, and is the type I error when the null hypothesis is that π = π l . The probability that the auditor's signal underestimates profits, or the type II error, is 1 − α. The cost of acquiring s is C(α, β), where C is twice differentiable, strictly convex, and increasing in both arguments. Moreover, C(1/2, 1/2) = 0 (i.e. if α = β = 1/2 the signal is completely uninformative and is equivalent to acquiring no information).
Assumption 2 plays an important role in the analysis, and implies that as the auditor reduces one type of error, it becomes costlier to reduce the other type of error. 6 For example, this type of tradeoff is present if (i) the total time the auditor spends reviewing transactions determines the overall accuracy of the audit, as measured for instance by the sum of the errors and (ii) the magnitude of each error is determined by whether the auditor applies a more or less conservative standard to the data. The following is a formal definition of when one estimate is more conservative than another: If an estimate, s, is more conservative thanŝ, then it is less likely to overstate profits, but at least as likely to understate profits. As is intuitive, for any given bonus the manager prefers estimates which are less conservative.
After receiving the manager's report and acquiring any additional information, the auditor sends a report, m ∈ {π l , π h }, to the investor. Like the manager, the auditor incurs a penalty if the market subsequently learns that she misreported profits. When the auditor reports m and the true level of profits is π, her expected penalty is: 
The expected penalty ist for overstating profits and t for understating profits. These penalties include fines, damages awarded to investors, loss of business, and loss of reputational capital. 7 I assume that the penalties are a function of factors such as the legal environment that are exogenous from the perspective of the investor.
The Sequence of Events
The timing of events, summarized in Figure 1 , is as follows:
1. The investor decides whether to hire the auditor, and offers the manager a compensation contract, w(m).
2. The manager chooses whether to pursue private benefits, determining the likelihood that profits are high.
3. π is realized, and the manager reports that profits are r.
4. The auditor observes r, chooses audit, (α, β), acquires a signal, s, and sends a message m to the investor.
5. The investor compensates the manager.
6. With some probability, π becomes publicly known, and the manager and auditor incur penalties if they misreported profits.
Though the model can be extended to accommodate compensation contracts that depend both on the report r and the message m, for simplicity, I assume that the contract can depend only on the "formal" estimate of profits, provided by the auditor. This estimate, however, potentially incorporates any information contained in the manager's report. 8
4 The Equilibrium
The Auditor's Reporting Decision
Suppose, for simplicity, that the manager's reservation utility is zero. This assumption, together with the assumption that the manager is protected by limited liability, implies that the manager receives no compensation when profits are low: w(π l ) = 0. The manager's compensation when profits are high is thus exactly his bonus: w(π h ) = R. Suppose that after observing both the manager's compensation contract and his report, the auditor's belief that profits are high is p = p(R, r). The auditor must decide how intensively to investigate the finances of the firm, and after acquiring any information, must decide what to report to the investor. More formally, the auditor chooses α, β, and the reporting strategy, m(s), to minimize her expected loss:
There are three relevant pure reporting strategies: m(s) = π l , m(s) = π h , and m(s) = s. 9 If p is close to zero, it may be optimal not to acquire any information, and simply report that profits are low. The expected loss from this strategy is pt. Similarly if p is near one, it may be optimal to report that profits are high, without undertaking an investigation. The expected loss from this strategy is (1 − p)t. The auditor obtains costly information only if she intends to utilize the information. Thus, whenever the auditor acquires a signal, the corresponding reporting strategy is m(s) = s. To ensure that the 8 A contract based only on the auditor's report gives the manager some base wage plus a bonus when the auditor reports that profits are high. If contracts could depend both on the manager's report and auditor's message, the investor would give the manager a positive level of compensation, w0, for truthfully reporting that profits are low (even if the manager's reservation utility is zero). When the manager reports that profits are high and the auditor confirms that report, the manager receives w0 plus an additional bonus. If, however, the manager reports that profits are high, but the auditor reports that profits are low, the manager is penalized and receives no compensation. A contract structured in this way gives the manager a greater incentive to report profits truthfully than a contract that is based only on m, lowering the cost of incentives.
9 The fourth possible pure strategy, which is to report high when the signal is low and vice versa, is never strictly optimal since the signal is weakly positively correlated with profits.
auditor actually serves some role, I make the following assumption:
Assumption 3 The cost of information and the penalties are such that if p equals e or e, it is strictly optimal for the auditor to acquire information.
If the auditor undertakes an investigation, (3) reduces to:
Let α(p) and β(p) denote the solution to (4) (uniqueness is assured by the strict convexity of C). When in the interior, the solution satisfies:
Lemma 1 Assumption 2 implies that 1 − α(p) and β(p) are decreasing in p and t and increasing int. Equivalently, as p or t decreases or ast increases, the auditor's estimate of profits, s, becomes more conservative.
Proof. The result follows directly from Theorem 4 (The Monotonicity Theorem) and Theorem 6 in Milgrom and Shannon (1994) .
Intuitively, the comparative statics are a consequence of the fact that (i) the errors, 1 − α and 1 − β, are substitutes and that (ii) as the auditor becomes less certain that profits are high or as eithert increases or t decreases, the expected cost of an understatement increases relative to the expected cost of an overstatement.
Lemma 2 Given Assumption 3 and Lemma 1, there exist cutoff points p < e <ē <p such that the auditor acquires information if p < p <p. For p >p (p < p) the auditor does not acquire any information and always reports that profits are high (low). For p =p (p = p), the auditor is indifferent between acquiring information and simply reporting that profits are high (low).
Proof. See the Appendix.
Recall that α(p) is the probability that the auditor's signal and, consequently, her report are correct if the true level of profits is high. β(p) is the probability that her report is correct if profits are low. Since the auditor acquires information only if p < p <p, the definition of α(p) and β(p) is not relevant for p >p or for p < p. Thus, for p >p, let α(p) = 1 and β(p) = 0, reflecting the fact that the auditor always reports that profits are high. For p < p, let α(p) = 0 and β(p) = 1. When p equalsp or p, the auditor may potentially use a mixed strategy, so that the probability that the auditor reports profits correctly can take a range of values. For example, if p =p and the auditor undertakes an investigation with probability z, the probability that the auditor correctly reports profits when they are low is zβ(p), where β(p) solves (4). At these special values of p, I use the notation somewhat loosely and let α(p) and β(p) denote the conditional probabilities that m = π, given the level of mixing.
Specified in this way, α(p) and β(p) completely characterize the auditor's best response as a function of her beliefs. Recall that the auditor's belief that profits are high, given the manager's compensation contract and report, is p(R, r). The auditor's optimal strategy is thus α(p(R, r)) and β(p(R, r)).
The Manager's Effort and Reporting Decisions
This section provides a characterization of the manager's strategy and the auditor's equilibrium beliefs. Recall that the manager chooses e ∈ {e,ē}, where e is the probability that profits are high. Let e(R) be the manager's choice given the bonus, R. After choosing a level of effort, the manager observes the realization of profits and reports that profits are r ∈ {π l , π h }. Let q(R, π) be the probability the manager reports that profits are high given the bonus and the realized level of profits. Note that I have omitted e as a potential argument of q(R, π); once profits are realized, the manager's report depends only on the magnitude of the bonus and his belief about the auditor's strategy.
The manager gains R when the auditor reports to the investor that profits are high. If profits are indeed high and the manager reports r, the probability that the auditor states that profits are high is α(p(R, r)). Therefore, a manager who observes high profits (the "high type") chooses to report that profits are high if, 10
Similarly, if profits are low and the manager reports r, the probability that the auditor states that profits are high is 1−β(p(R, r)). In addition, the manager receives an expected penalty of T if he overstates profits. The low type thus reports that profits are high if
Both α(p) and 1−β(p) are increasing in p; so if there were no penalty for misreporting, the manager would send the message that maximizes p(R, r) regardless of the true level of profits. I focus on sequential equilibria, with the additional condition that,
When both messages are sent in equilibrium, p(R, r) necessarily satisfies (7). In particular, if p(R, π h ) ≤ p(R, π l ), then the low type strictly prefers to report that profits are low. Therefore, such beliefs can be sustained only if the high type also reports that profits are low so that the message r = π h is off the equilibrium path. Condition (7) is thus a restriction on off the equilibrium path beliefs, and rules out the equilibrium in which p(R, π h ) is so low relative to p(R, π l ) that both types prefer to report that profits are low. In this equilibrium, the auditor holds the unreasonable belief that profits are less likely to be high when the manager reports that they are high than when he reports they are low, despite the presence of penalties for overstating profits. One way to justify condition (7) is to suppose that an arbitrarily small proportion of the managers always report profits truthfully. In this case, the message r = π h is necessarily on the equilibrium path, from which it follows that p(R, π h ) > p(R, π l ). Thus, only equilibria which satisfy condition (7) can survive such "trembles."
, the high type strictly prefers to report that profits are high, implying that q(R, π h ) = 1. It remains to determine the strategy of the low type. Given e(R) and q(R, π l ), the auditor's equilibrium posterior belief upon receiving a report that profits are high is
To induce the manager to exert a high level of effort, the bonus must exceed b/∆e, which in turn is greater than T . Consequently, for the relevant range of R a separating equilibrium is not possible, since if both types report truthfully, then p(R, π h ) = 1 and the auditor reports that profits are high without undertaking an investigation, creating an incentive for the low type to also report high profits. Therefore, the equilibrium must involve some pooling: namely, the low type sometimes reports that profits are high. In a pure pooling equilibrium, the manager always reports that profits are high, p(R, π h ) = e(R), and p(R, π l ) must be sufficiently small that the low type prefers to report that profits are high. In a partial pooling equilibrium, the low type is indifferent regarding his choice of r and reports each message with positive probability, while the high type announces r = π h . 11 It follows that p(R, π l ) = 0 and p(R, π h ) > e(R). Recall that β(0) = 1. Hence, when profits are low, the manager is indifferent about his report only if
Intuitively, the level of scrutiny and the size of the bonus is such that the manager is just willing to risk exposing himself to potential penalties. The highest possible value of the auditor's posterior in a pure pooling equilibrium is
It follows that pure pooling cannot be an equilibrium whenever R <R: if the auditor believes that low types always misreport, she monitors with a degree of scrutiny that discourages misreporting, given the size of the bonus and the expected penalty. Rather, there is a partial pooling equilibrium, in which the auditor's equilibrium posterior p(R, π h ) solves (9). 12 Henceforth, I assume that R <R and focus on the case in which there is partial pooling (in the following subsection, I provide conditions under which the optimal bonus indeed satisfies this condition). There are several reasons for concentrating on this case: (i) if a partial pooling equilibrium exists, it is unique; (ii) it is arguably the more interesting and realistic case since the manager does not always overstate profits; and (iii) limiting consideration to partial pooling greatly simplifies the exposition. The reason that the partial pooling equilibrium is particulary tractable is apparent from (9). The belief that solves (9) is unique and independent of e(R), implying that given R, the auditor's equilibrium strategy is the same regardless of the manager's level of effort. This property of the equilibrium makes it unique; if the auditor's level of monitoring varies with the level of effort she believes the manager is exerting, then there could be multiple equilibria.
Let U (e, R) be the manager's expected compensation if the bonus is R and his level of effort is e:
With probability e, realized profits are high, and the manager reports that they are high and receives the bonus with probability α(p(R, π h )). With probability (1 − e), profits are low and the manager receives zero expected compensation regardless of whether he reports that profits are high or low. Define ∆U (R) ≡ U (ē, R) − U (e, R); the manager exerts a high level of effort only if
Given the manager's equilibrium effort level and the auditor's equilibrium posterior belief, equation (8) uniquely determines the probability, q(R, π l ), that the manager overstates profits. The following proposition summarizes the preceding analysis. 13 
Proposition 1 Consider the subgame following the investor's choice of a bonus, R, where
T < R <R. Let p(R, π h ) solve (9). If ∆U (R) ≥ (<) b,
If the manager reports that profits are low, the auditor reports that profits are low, without acquiring any information. If the manager reports that profits are high, the auditor acquires a signal and reports its realization to the investor. The probability that the signal understates profits is 1 − α(p(R, π)) and the probability that the signal overstates profits is 1 − β(p(R, π)).
Notice that from equation (9), p(R, π h ) is decreasing in R and increasing in both T andt, from which it follows that q(R, π l ) is increasing in R and decreasing in the latter two parameters, establishing the following corollary:
Corollary 1 The reliability of the manager's reporting declines as the bonus increases and as either the manager's or auditor's expected penalty for overstating profits decreases.
These comparative statics results are partial equilibrium in nature as R is endogenous. In the following section, I solve for the equilibrium bonus.
The Cost of Incentives
The investor's problem is to choose a bonus that induces a high level of effort at minimum cost. Interestingly, if the investor increases the bonus, the manager may actually 13 Implicit in the statement of the proposition is the assumption that the manager always chooses high effort when he is indifferent. Strictly speaking, if ∆U (R) = b, there are two equilibria in the continuation game: one in which the manager exerts high effort and another in which he exerts low effort. However, it is not an equilibrium in the full game for the manager to choose a low level of effort, since the investor would have an incentive to slightly increase the bonus. Thus, I ignore the low effort equilibrium.
decrease his effort. In particular, ∆U (R) = ∆e · α(p(R, π h ))R is not necessarily increasing in R . Holding α(p(R, π h ) ) fixed, increasing the bonus has the standard effect of increasing the manager's incentive to maximize the firm's profits. However, as R increases, the manager's level of misreporting, q(R, π l ), increases. The auditor responds by estimating profits more conservatively, causing α(p (R, π h ) ) to decrease. If α(p(R, π h )) decreases sufficiently, ∆U (R) decreases, and the manager has a lower incentive to exert high effort. Intuitively, the increased noise in the manager's reporting causes the measure of his performance (the auditor's signal) to degrade sufficiently that the manager's incentives actually worsen. Recall that without an auditor the manager reports truthfully only if R ≤ T and always misreports otherwise, so that the signal quality (the manager's report) is either fully informative or totally uninformative. With the auditor, the informativeness of the signal changes continuously with R. Nonetheless, there remains a potential non-monotonicity between incentives and effort.
Since Proposition 1 does not apply to bonuses greater thanR, I only consider bonuses that are less thanR, i.e., I assume that a partial pooling equilibrium exists. If there exists a bonus that implements the high level of effort and is less thanR, it is never optimal for the principal to choose a larger bonus, so that this restriction is without loss of generality (see Lemma 3 below for a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of such a bonus). Assuming R is sufficient to induce the high level of effort, the expected cost of incentives is: 14
If the investor offers the manager a bonus, the optimal choice of R minimizes (11) subject to (10). Like ∆U (R), I(R) is not necessarily increasing in R. Nonetheless, the bonus that solves the investor's problem is the smallest value of R which satisfies the incentive constraint, (10). Using ∆U (R) = ∆e · α(p(R, π h ))R and substituting equation (9) into (11),
The first term in (12) is minimized when (10) is satisfied with equality, and the remaining terms are unambiguously increasing in R. Therefore, if a partial pooling equilibrium exists, 14 Implicit in this specification is the assumption that the investor does not receive any part of the penalties if it is established that the manager misreported profits. In practice, investors may receive some compensation for the losses they incur as a result of misreporting. In the context of the model, all that matters is that the investor bears some portion of the losses. 
∆U (R)
Moreover, if such a value of p exists, p(R * , π h ) = max{p :
For a signal, s, v = α/(1 − β) is a measure of the accuracy of the signal in the sense that P (π = π h |s = π h ) is increasing in v. Intuitively, as v increases, the investor is more certain that the bonus is serving its purpose of rewarding good performance. Lemma 3 thus implies that it is possible to induce high effort and sustain relatively truthful reporting 15 More formally, the investor would choose the smallest R such that ∆U (R) ≥ b. If ∆U (R) can jump, the optimal bonus may not satisfy ∆U (R) = b. However, the regularity conditions on C(α, β) ensure that α(p(R, π h )) and thus ∆U (R) are continuous.
as long as the potential benefit from misreporting, as measured by the size of b/∆e relative to T , is not too large relative to the quality of the auditing.
Henceforth, I assume that condition (14) holds, so that R * exists. If the investor does not offer the manager incentives, his expected payoff is π l + e∆π. By offering R * , the investor's expected gain relative to this benchmark is
If V * < 0, incentives are prohibitively costly and there is no equilibrium in which the investor offers the manager a bonus. If V * > 0, the value that the manager generates covers both the expected bonus and the auditor's fee, making the use of incentives optimal. Therefore, if V * > 0, R * together with the strategies and beliefs outlined in Proposition 1 form an equilibrium. Moreover, this equilibrium is unique since (i) Proposition 1 implies that for any R <R the equilibrium in the continuation game is unique, (ii) there is no bonus lower than R * that induces high effort, and (iii) increasing the bonus either raises the cost of incentives and/or lowers the manager's effort. Henceforth, I consider the case in which V * > 0 and the investor actually offers the manager an incentive contract. Let I * = I(R * ) denote the equilibrium cost of incentives, and let q * = q(R * , π l ) be the equilibrium probability the manager misreports profits when they are low. Substituting ∆U (R * ) = b into equation (12), we have that
Interestingly, the only endogenous variable in the above expression is the level of misreporting, q * . The quality of the audit matters only insofar as it increases the reliability of the manager's reporting. The first term in the sum is the expected cost of incentives when π is observable, while the second term reflects the additional cost when π is unobservable, and the investor must rely on the auditor's noisy measure of profits to gauge the manager's performance. Conditional on profits being low, the probability that both the manager and the auditor report that profits are high is q * (1 − β * ). The expected payment by the investor is thus q * (1 − β * )R * = q * T . The term (1 −ē)q * T is therefore the expected compensation the investor pays as a result of the misreporting.
Comparative Statics
At this stage in the analysis, a natural question is how a change in certain parameters, such as the manager's penalty for misreporting profits, affects the quality of disclosure and the cost of incentives. The first step in deriving the comparative statics is to express the equilibrium conditions in a form that is amenable to analysis. Given the level of misreporting, q * , and the manager's effort decision, e(R * ) =ē, the auditor's posterior belief that profits are high when the manager reports that they are high is
The auditor's equilibrium monitoring decisions, α * and β * , are in turn given by
Since the auditor's posterior is not of direct interest, I substitute the right-hand side of (17) for p(R * , π h ) and re-parameterize α(·) and β(·) in terms of q * . Equations (18) and (19) thus become α * = α(q * ,t, t) and β * = β(q * ,t, t).
There are two additional modifications to (18) and (19) that are useful. By Proposition 1, α(·) is decreasing and β(·) is increasing in q * (i.e., the auditor's estimate of profits grows more conservative as the level of misreporting by the manager increases). The first modification is to invert β(·). In particular, let q(·,t, t) = β −1 (·,t, t). Condition (19) is equivalent to
In addition to decreasing in β, note that q(·) is decreasing in the auditor's penalty for overstating profits,t, and increasing in the auditor's penalty for understating profits, t. The second modification involves re-parameterizing (18) once more. The form of the auditor's maximization problem (see (4)) implies that the auditor's penalty for overstating profitst impacts the choice of α only via its impact on β. Equivalently, given β, the optimal choice of α is independent oft. Using the notation somewhat loosely, we can rewrite condition (18) as
Assumption 2 implies that decreasing the likelihood of one type of error makes it costlier for the auditor to reduce the other type of error, implying that α(·) is decreasing in β. The equilibrium must also satisfy conditions (9) and (13), which when rearranged 
The system of equations (20)- (23) completely characterizes the equilibrium; moreover, each equation describes how a given endogenous variable directly varies with the other variables in the model. For example, from equation (21), we have that the probability that the auditor correctly reports profits when they are high, α * , decreases if β * or q * increase or if t decreases. Changes in the remaining variables affect α * only indirectly via changes in β * or q * . The first column of Table 1 summarizes these effects. Similarly, the probability that the auditor correctly identifies that profits are low, β * , increases in the bonus, R * , and decreases in the manager's penalty, T ; these effects are summarized in column 2 of the table. Finally, columns 3 and 4 summarize how the level of misreporting, q * , and the bonus, R * , interact with the other variables From the table, it is apparent that all the endogenous variables, 1 − α * , β * , q * , and R * , interact positively, so that changes in the variables are mutually reinforcing. Any exogenous change that increases one of the endogenous variables, in equilibrium, results in an increase in all of the endogenous variables. With the exception of a change in the auditor's penalty for understating profits, a change in any of the exogenous parameters in Table 1 has a direct effect on only one of the endogenous variables, and thus has an unambiguous effect on all the endogenous variables. Recall that if both 1 − α * and β * increase, the signal s * that the auditor reports is less likely to overstate profits and is thus termed more conservative. We have the following proposition: If the manager's private benefits increase, the investor must raise the manager's bonus. The increase in the bonus, in turn, raises the level of misreporting and causes the auditor to estimate profits more conservatively. 16 Given the change in the auditor's reporting, the manager is less likely to be rewarded for good performance; so to motivate the manager, it is necessary for the bonus to rise by more than is dictated by the initial increase in private benefits. The cost to the investor can be decomposed into the direct cost resulting from the need to raise the bonus holding the manager's and auditor's reporting decisions fixed and the indirect cost resulting from the erosion in the quality of the reporting:
Proposition 3 If the manager's private benefits, b, increase or if there is a decrease in either the manager's penalty for misreporting, T , or in cost to the auditor of overstating profits,t, then the manager's bonus, R
The analysis suggests that as a consequence of feedback effects between the level of the manager's compensation and the quality of reporting, the cost of an increase in private benefits may be significantly higher than otherwise expected. It is not surprising that an increase in the manager's penalty, T , lowers the level of managerial misreporting. More surprising, however, is that the auditor may respond to the change in the manager's reporting behavior in a way that is harmful to the investor. In particular, as the manager's reporting grows more reliable, the auditor takes a less conservative stance and is thus less likely to detect inflated profits. The change in I * depends on the change in q * T = q * R * (1 − β * ). q * R * decreases, but (1 − β * ) increases, making the net change ambiguous. 17 Therefore, increasing the manager's penalty can actually reduce the investor's welfare. In contrast, increasing the auditor's liability for an inflated profit report unambiguously increases welfare; i.e., q * decreases and all the other components in I * are unchanged. We thus have the following corollary to Proposition 3,
Corollary 2 An increase in the auditor's penalty for overstating profits increases the investor's welfare; an increase in the manager's penalty, on the other hand, may increase or decrease the investor's welfare.
One caveat that applies to this result is that the model does not account for the possibility that increasing the auditor's penalties may raise the fee for the audit; the model merely 16 Note that the manager's bonus and penalty determine the equilibrium value of β * . The level of misreporting must be such that the auditor chooses β * . The sequence of interactions in Table 1 reflects this logic. However, in discussing the effects, it is natural to reverse the chain of reasoning so that a change in the bonus affects the level of misreporting and thus the auditor's information acquisition decisions.
17 This can verified using an example. In particular, using a quadratic cost function,
, setting b/∆e =t = t = 1 andē = 1/2, and letting T vary gives the result.
implies that increasing the auditor's liability has at least the desired benefit of increasing the quality of disclosure. As discussed earlier in the paper, the auditor essentially has a multi-tasking problem. Excessively strong incentives to avoid either understating or overstating profits can in principle undermine the overall informativeness of the auditor's reporting and lower the investor's welfare. The fact that the investor's welfare is increasing int is a consequence of the fact that as the auditor becomes more conservative, the manager has an incentive to provide more accurate information, so that the overall quality of the reporting increases. In particular, Proposition 3 implies that if the auditor's penalty for overstating profits increases, the equilibrium audit actually becomes less conservative, i.e., β * decreases and α * increases. All else equal, the auditor's choice of β is increasing int. However, as the auditor increases her scrutiny of the manager's report, the level of misreporting by the manager decreases. In equilibrium, the level of misreporting declines sufficiently such that the auditor is less likely to question the manager's assessment of profits. The results therefore imply that "excessive conservatism" on the part of the auditor is not problematic for the investor.
An increase in the penalty for understating profits, on the other hand, may have potentially negative consequences. As can be seen from Table 1 , an increase in t reduces the likelihood that the auditor understates profits, which in itself is positive for the investor. However, the auditor may apply less effort towards identifying inflated profits reports, increasing the incentive of the manager to misreport profits. The net effect on the investor depends on the degree to which a reduction in the frequency of understatements comes at the expense of an increase in the frequency of overstatements. If the cost of acquiring information C(α, β) is such that there is a high degree of substitutability between α and β, an increase in t may result in less effective oversight and a decrease in investor welfare. If, on the other hand, there is little interaction between α and β, then an increase in t causes the auditor to lower the likelihood of an understatement without substantially increasing the likelihood of an overstatement. In this case, the overall quality of the audit increases, and the investor is better off.
An important determinant of the magnitude of t is the extent to which the manager can punish the auditor for being excessively conservative. The fact that raising the auditor's penalty for understating profits may decrease investor welfare suggests that if the manager has undue influence over the auditor it may harm the investor. I consider this possibility explicitly in what follows.
Commitment and Collusion
In this section, I allow the manager and the auditor to form collusive agreements (or what, in some circumstances, might be more aptly called cooperative agreements). I take the standard approach of modelling collusion as a side contract between the auditor and the manager. This modelling device is a reduced form meant to capture self-enforcing agreements and reciprocation sustained through repeated interaction. 18 The side contract specifies the auditor's information acquisition and reporting strategies as a function of any messages sent by the manager, as well as any side payments between parties.
The ability of the auditor to commit to a particular strategy is in itself a potentially beneficial facet of the side contract, as it facilitates communication, allowing for possibly more informative reporting at a lower cost. Implicit in this reasoning, however, is the assumption that the auditor cannot make similar commitments to the investor, i.e., promise to audit with a certain intensity. If the investor could write such a contract with the auditor, side contracting between the auditor and manager could only harm the investor. This assumption is arguably realistic, since managers and their auditors are likely to interact closely, while arm's-length investors are at best likely to have minimal contact with auditors (of course, investors delegate this responsibility to the board of directors, but this fact only introduces an additional layer of agency, with a similar set of problems). Not only are managers more likely to have extended relationships with auditors, managers and auditors are more likely to observe the actions of one another, making it more feasible to sustain agreements. In particular, a commitment by the auditor to use a given audit strategy is plausible only if her monitoring decisions are observable, which is likely in the case of the manager.
It is in the interests of both the manager and the auditor to report profits accurately when they are high. It is also in the interest of the coalition to minimize the resources the auditor spends to acquire information. Ift ≤ R − T , the auditor loses less than the manager gains when profits are inflated. Thus, a coalition between the manager and auditor maximizes their joint welfare by always reporting that profits are high, eliminating the need to conduct an audit. On the other hand, ift > R − T , joint welfare is maximized by always reporting profits truthfully. To induce the manager to report the profits to the auditor truthfully, the side payments can be structured in such a way that the manager is indifferent about his report, again eliminating the need for an audit. In this latter case, though the reporting is perfectly accurate, the manager bears no risk and so has no incentive to maximize profits, undermining the value of the incentive contract. Thus, side contracting has an unambiguously negative impact on the investor's welfare.
This conclusion depends heavily on the assumption that auditor and manager can make arbitrary transfers to each other. In practice, given the riskiness of outright bribes, the parties are likely to use more subtle but less flexible instruments, such as promising additional business in exchange for a favorable audit. In terms of the model, to qualitatively capture the limited scope of agreements between the parties, it is necessary to place some restrictions on the side contracts. The transfers can in principle be quite complex and depend on the messages of both parties, as well as any other information. One way to limit the side contracts is to require that the transfers take a particularly simple form; namely, that they be uncontingent. The possibility of a quid pro quo remains: the manager can offer the auditor a transfer in exchange for a commitment by the auditor to use a favorable reporting strategy. However, the transfers cannot be "fine tuned" in such a way that they essentially result in a new compensation package for the manager. In particular, the transfers cannot flatten out the manager's compensation schedule; one consequence is that the auditor must actually conduct an audit in order to induce the manager to reveal the true level of profits. Alternative restrictions on the side contracts, such as limits on the size of the side payments, while changing the precise form of the optimal contract, give similar results. The requirement that the transfers be lump-sum is, however, the simplest restriction to analyze.
The auditor offers a side contract of the form C = {α(r), β(r), µ(r, s), y}, where α(r) and β(r) are the auditor's monitoring decisions upon receiving a profit report r, µ(r, s) is the probability the auditor reports profits are high given r and the signal s, and y is the unconditional transfer from the manager to the auditor. 19 At the time the auditor and manager contract, the manager has private information on profits (the manager knows the probability that profits are high or the actual realization depending on the exact timing of events). 20 The requirement that the auditor offers the contract simplifies the analysis by eliminating the possibility that the manager can signal his information through the choice of a contract.
By the revelation principle, there is no loss of generality in assuming that C induces the manager to report profits truthfully. The manager's message to the auditor, r, can be viewed as an internal communication between the manager and the auditor. Omitted from the description of C is the fact that the contract must specify not only the auditor's message to the investor as a function of r and s, but also a messager(r, s), which is the manager's formal message to the investor (on which any future punishments are based). Since the auditor is fully informed about the true level of profits, ifr = m, it would signal to the investor that one party is misreporting profits, making punishment almost certain. Rather than endogenize the punishments so that they reflect these considerations, I make the simplifying assumption that the auditor's message and the manager's formal announcement must be coordinated.
There are two incentive compatibility conditions for the manager. His truth-telling 19 Implicit in this specification of the contract is the assumption that the manager can observe the auditor's effort decisions.
20 The approach I take to modelling collusion between asymmetrically informed parties is related to that of Laffont and Martimort (1997) .
condition when profits are high is
and when profits are low is (24) where
Only the low type's incentive compatibility condition is binding. 21 In order to induce the manager to report profits truthfully when they are low, the auditor has two instruments: either she can commit to report that profits are high with some frequency or she can conduct a sufficiently rigorous audit when the manager announces profits are high to dissuade misreporting.
Given that arbitrary lump-sum transfers are possible, the optimal choice of C maximizes the sum of the auditor's and manager's expected utilities subject to (24). The exact division of the surplus is determined by y and does not play an important role in the analysis. 22 Let µ(π) be the conditional probability that the auditor reports that profits are high given that the true profit (which in equilibrium the manager reports to the auditor) is π. In particular,
The joint expected utility is given by
whereê ∈ [e,ē] is the effort level the auditor believes that the manager has chosen. 23 Suppose profits are high: if the auditor reports that profits are high, the utility of the 21 The fact that the truth-telling constraint is not binding when profits are high can be easily verified by checking that the solution omitting the additional constraint indeed satisfies that constraint.
22 One consequence of the assumption that the auditor's report and the manager's formal report must be coordinated is that there is no side contract that perfectly replicates the outcome without side-contracting. For example, in the partial pooling equilibrium, the low type does not earn a rent. However, equation (24) implies that for any contract C (except for degenerate contracts in which the auditor always reports that profits are low or high), the low type must receive an information rent. Nonetheless, only in rare cases will the particular noncooperative outcome give a higher payoff to the auditor-manager coalition than any feasible side contract (a sufficient, though far from necessary, condition to rule this possibility out is that t < T + R). In what follows, I ignore this possibility.
23 If e <ê <ē the auditor believes the manager is using a mixed strategy and pursuing private benefits with some probability.
coalition is R; otherwise the payoff of the coalition is −t. Similarly, if profits are low and if the auditor reports that profits are low, the utility of coalition is 0; otherwise the payoff is the bonus minus the sum of the penalties: R − T −t. The remaining term is the expected cost of the audit. The next lemma partially characterizes the form of the optimal (lump-sum) contract.
Lemma 4 In the optimal side contract, the auditor does not acquire any information when the manager reports that profits are low; in particular, α(π l ) = β(π l ) = 1/2. In addition, the auditor either (i) acquires a signal when the manager reports that profits are high and reports it to the investor accurately (i.e., µ(π h , π h ) = 1 and µ(π h , π l ) = 0) or (ii) never acquires information and always reports that profits are high (i.e., µ(r, s) = 1 for all r and s).
If the manager reports that profits are low, the auditor does not expend any resources acquiring information, but simply reports to the investor that profits are high with probability µ(π l ) and low with probability 1 − µ(π l ). Moreover, either µ(π l ) = 1 and the auditor always reports that profits are high; or µ(π l ) < 1 and the auditor actually conducts an investigation whenever r = π h and reports her signal to the investor. In this latter case, µ(π h , π h ) = 1 and µ(π h , π l ) = 0 and the incentive compatibility condition, (24) reduces to
Equation (26) implies that to induce the manager to reveal his private information about profits, the auditor must promise not to always disclose bad news to the investor. In particular, even if the auditor is acting largely in the interest of investors, commitment requires that the auditor at times knowingly misreports profits. The side contract entails auditing if acquiring information is not too costly and if the expected penalties are substantial relative to the bonus. A necessary condition for there to be auditing is that R < T +t; otherwise it is always optimal for the coalition to obtain the bonus. If R < T +t, then W (C) is decreasing in µ(π h ). Thus if there is auditing it is optimal for (26) to be satisfied with equality. Substituting µ(π l ) = 1 − β(π h ), µ(π h , π h ) = 1, and µ(π h , π l ) = 0 into (25), yields a simpler expression for W (C):
Let α c (R,ê) and β c (R,ê) maximize W (α, β). The comparative statics on α c (·) and β c (·) are analogous to those on α(ê) and β(ê), as described in Lemma 1. However, there are two additional comparative statics (which again follow from applying the results in Milgrom and Shannon (1994) ):
Lemma 5 Suppose the optimal side contract involves auditing. If the manager reports that profits are high, the auditor chooses effort levels β c (R,ê) and α c (R,ê), where β c (R,ê) and 1 − α c (R,ê) are decreasing in R and increasing in T . Equivalently, the optimal estimate of profits, s c , becomes less conservative as either the manager's bonus increases or the manager's penalty decreases.
As the manager's incentive compensation increases, collusion between the manager and auditor manifests itself in audits that are increasingly likely to overstate profits. This result is a consequence of the fact that the auditor now internalizes the benefit of obtaining the bonus, and stands in contrast to the case without side contracting, in which an increase in R (say via an increase in b), reduces the reliability of the manager's report and leads to a more conservative audit. From Lemma 5, we have that an increase in the manager's penalty results in a more conservative audit. This result is again in contrast to the case without side-contracting, in which an increase in T decreases the likelihood that the auditor questions the manager's report.
Given that R > T , side contracting effectively increases the cost to the auditor of an understatement relative to an overstatement, which intuitively may have negative consequences for the investor. However, as mentioned at the outset of this section, there is a potential benefit to side contracting, which stems from the auditor's ability to commit to a certain level of auditing. Commitment lowers the frequency of the audit, thus economizing on the cost of acquiring information. In particular, the audit takes place with probabilitŷ e versus probabilityê + (1 −ê)q in the equilibrium without side-contracting. Moreover, the marginal cost of acquiring information is effectively lower; this fact can most easily be seen by considering the first-order conditions that α c and β c satisfy when there is an interior solution:ê
e ∂C(α, β) ∂β
Relative to first-order conditions defining the optimal audit without side-contracting (see equations (5) and (6)), the marginal cost of information is scaled down byê. Intuitively, committing to audit intensively when profits are high has benefits regardless of the realization of profits, but is costly only in the contingency that they are high, making an increase in the audit intensity more attractive. Let C(R,ê) denote the optimal contract between the manager and auditor, given a bonus, R, and the level of effort,ê, that the auditor believes the manager has exerted. If R andê are such that the auditor always reports that profits are high, the manager has no incentive to exert effort. If the auditor actually conducts an audit, C(R,ê) gives the manager a payoff:
The manager is willing to exert a high level of effort if
The manager's optimal level of effort depends on the level of effort,ê, the auditor believes the manager has taken. Therefore, there are potentially multiple equilibria in the subgame following the investor's choice of bonus. Moreover, it is possible that the manager exerts high effort if the auditor believes the manager has exerted low effort and vice versa. In such a case, the equilibrium must involve mixed strategies. I proceed by identifying the most favorable equilibrium for the investor, and then provide conditions under which it is unique. Let A denote the set of values ofê ∈ [e,ē] such that there exists a bonus R for which (i) the side contract C(R,ê) entails auditing and (ii) given C(R,ê), the manager is willing to exert a high level of effort. Ifê > e andê / ∈ A, there is no equilibrium in which the manager exerts an effort levelê. Forê ∈ A define R(ê) = min{R : ∆U c (R,ê) = b} R(ê) is the smallest bonus that induces the manager to exert high effort, given that the auditor believes the manager has exerted a high level of effort with probabilityê. Given R(ê), a potential equilibrium is for the manager to choose effort e =ê and for the auditor to offer the side contract, C(R(ê),ê). If e <ê <ē, the equilibrium calls for the manager to use a mixed strategy and exert a high level of effort with some probability. One interpretation of such a strategy is that there is unobserved variation in the magnitude of the private benefits of managers, in which case, the manager exerts high effort if he is a certain type (see footnote 11). Given that the auditor and manager use these strategies, the cost to the investor of offering R(e) and implementing an effort level e ∈ A is
where the last equality follows from the fact that ∆U c (R(e), e) = b. Moreover, it follows from the definition of R(e) that it is not possible for the investor to implement e at a lower cost. The net benefit to the investor from implementing e (relative to the benchmark without incentives) is thus:
Let e * maximize V c (e). 24 V c (e * ) is the most favorable equilibrium payoff for the investor. If V c (e * ) < 0, it is not cost effective for the investor to offer incentives under any circumstances. If ∆U c (R, e) is strictly decreasing in e, the equilibrium effort induced by the bonus R(e) is in fact unique. In particular, if the auditor believes the manager has taken action e < e, she monitors with an intensity that induces the manager to exert the high level of effort (i.e. ∆U (R(e), e ) > b), which cannot be an equilibrium. Conversely, if the auditor believes the manager has taken action e > e, she monitors with an intensity that causes the manager to shirk, which again cannot be an equilibrium. We thus have the following proposition: A notable property of the equilibrium is that the manager does not necessarily exert the first-best level of effort (i.e., with some probability he exerts low effort). Roughly, if ∆U (R, e) is decreasing in e, then the quality of the audit declines as the auditor becomes more certain that the manager has exerted high effort, making it costly to implement a high level of effort. The investor thus has an incentive to implement a level of effort that is not first-best. 25 Of course, there is minimal distortion to the extent that the marginal product of the manager's effort, ∆π, is large relative to these other considerations.
The following lemma provides conditions under which ∆U c (R, e) is indeed decreasing in e, thus giving a sufficient condition for uniqueness. In addition, the lemma also provides conditions under which ∆U c (R, e) is increasing in the various penalties, which is useful for characterizing the comparative statics. Demski and Sappington (1987) have a result that is related in spirit: a principal may distort the production decisions of a regulated firm to induce the regulator to monitor with greater effort.
If ∆U c (R, e) is increasing in a given parameter, the bonus necessary to induce a given level of effort, R(e), is decreasing in that parameter. As R(e) decreases, the probability the auditor overstates profits, 1 − β(·), decreases. It follows from (30) that the cost of incentives, I c (e), decreases as well, giving the next result:
Proposition 5 If the conditions in Lemma 6 hold, then an increase in any of the penalties increases the investor's welfare.
If the interaction between α and β is not too large, an increase in the manager's penalty or the auditor's penalty for overstating profits causes the auditor to decrease the likelihood of an overstatement, without significantly increasing the likelihood of understatement; the increased accuracy of the audit, in turn, strengthens the manager's incentives to exert high effort. There is a similar intuition for an increase in the auditor's penalty for understating profits. As discussed in the previous section, when there is high degree of substitutability between the two types of auditor effort, so that a reduction of one type of error comes at the expense of the other, increasing the penalties may have perverse results.
It is not difficult to construct an example in which the investor is better off when the auditor and manager side contract. 26 In any such example, the ability of the auditor to commit to an audit strategy significantly reduces the cost of information and increases the quality of the disclosure, despite the fact that the auditor internalizes the manager's benefit from receiving the incentive compensation. If, however, the bonus is large (as is necessary if private benefits are large) relative to the expected penalties of both the auditor and the manager, then side contracts substantially erode the reliability of reporting. In the ideal scenario for the investor, the auditor would have the power to commit to a particular audit and reporting strategy, but side payments between the auditor and the manager would be barred. In this case, the auditor would compensate the manager for providing information by occasionally withholding bad news, but it would not be possible for the manager to essentially pay the auditor to grossly distort her reporting. A policy that limits non-audit services effectively limits the magnitude of possible side payments. It is not as clear, however, how such a policy affects the commitment capacity of auditors. Requiring firms to rotate auditors periodically is likely to be more costly in this regard.
Conclusion
There is a rich interaction between a manager's incentive compensation and the quality of the information disclosed to investors. An increase in incentive compensation has both a direct and an indirect effect on the manager's willingness to exert effort on behalf of investors. The direct (and commonly cited) effect is to increase the manager's stake in the firm, and holding all else equal, strengthen his incentive to take profit maximizing actions. The indirect effect is that it erodes the manager's incentive to report profits truthfully. The increased incidence of managerial misreporting, in turn, impacts the reporting of the auditor, for whom the manager is an important source of information. The upshot is that reported profits may become a less reliable measure of performance, raising the cost of motivating the manager. If this effect is sufficiently strong, the manager may actually decrease effort in response to an increase in incentive compensation.
In the model, investors choose the level of incentives optimally, and would never choose such an inefficient level of compensation. In actuality, managers have significant influence over the level of their compensation. If a manager is able to obtain excessive incentive compensation, the model suggests that the cost to investors may far exceed the nominal value of the compensation. Stated differently, there is a level of incentive compensation beyond which it is more efficient to pay out any additional compensation as a flat wage, even if the manager is risk-neutral.
There are two instruments that govern the reporting behavior of the manager in my framework: the penalty for misreporting and the auditor's oversight. The model implies that these two instruments do not necessarily complement each other. As the manager's penalty for fraudulent reporting increases, there is greater moral hazard on the part of the auditor (in the case without side contracting). Consequently, a policy that increases the penalties that managers face for misreporting may actually harm investors. Increasing the liability of auditors for certifying an inflated profit report is more certain to achieve the desired outcome. This result follows even allowing for the possibility that such an increase may cause auditors to become excessively conservative in their assessment of a firm's true financial condition.
A major concern is the extent to which relationships between managers and auditors undermine the quality of reporting. I consider agreements between the auditor and manager that have two key elements: (i) side payments and (ii) a commitment by the auditor to monitor with a certain intensity and to use any information disclosed by the manager in a pre-specified way. Side payments effectively cause the auditor to internalize the benefit to the manager of receiving the incentive compensation. Thus as the magnitude of the manager's incentive compensation increases, the auditor is increasingly likely to overstate profits, which of course, is costly to the investor. The ability of the auditor to commit, however, enables her to obtain greater information from the manager and at a lower cost than otherwise possible. This facet of the auditor-manager relationship may actually yield benefits to the investor.
Commitment requires that the auditor occasionally withhold certain disclosures from investors, even when acting largely in their interest. The idea that to obtain information it may at times be necessary to refrain from disclosing a negative revelation has applications in other contexts as well. For example, equity analysts commonly argue that if they were to issue a negative report, the firm's management would limit their future access to information, undermining their overall effectiveness; thus to some extent analysts may compromise on their reports to gain valuable information for their clients. 27 As a consequence of the interaction between the level of incentives and quality of the reporting, incentives are likely to be a costlier instrument for aligning the interests of managers and investors than might otherwise be expected. Given this fact, incentives are not a universal substitute for forms of governance that limit a manager's ability to pursue private benefits.
(i) always report that profits are high, (ii) always report that they are low, or (iii) to acquire a signal when the manager reports that profits are high and accurately report that signal to the investor. To complete the proof, it is necessary to show that the only relevant alternatives are (i) and (iii). This fact follows directly from Assumption 3, which guarantees that when there is no side contracting it is optimal for the auditor to acquire information whenever e ≤ p ≤ē. Side contracting decreases the relative payoff of alternative (ii) since the auditor now internalizes the cost of the foregone bonus and since the marginal cost of information is effectively lower (i.e., C(α(π h ), β(π h )) is scaled down byê). Therefore, it is never optimal to always report that profits are low.
Proof of Lemma 6.
In the interior, α c (·) and β c (·) must satisfy equations (27) and (28). Implicitly differentiating, yields: Rearranging terms gives the result. A similar calculation applies to t.
